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FOLLOWING YOU HERE, THERE, AND
EVERYWHERE: AN INVESTIGATION OF




In an increasingly mobile society, there is immense value in
knowing one's location. Social network applications such as
Foursquare' and Facebook PlaceS2 continue to grow in popularity,3
and global positioning systems ("GPS") also enable drivers to get
directions and assist emergency responders in locating cars.4 The
emergence of this technology has had a profound effect on law
enforcement.5
* J.D. 2011, William & Mary School of Law; A.B. 2008, Mount Holyoke
College. Ms. Forbes began this Article as part of her studies and presently
serves as a law clerk for the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division.
Many thanks to the staff of the John Marshall Law Review for their hard work
and to Professor William W. Van Alstyne for encouraging my research.
1. Foursquare is "a location-based mobile platform that . .. [lets] users
share their location with friends." About Foursquare, FOURSQUARE,
http://foursquare.com/about (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
2. Facebook users may use the Places application to "find out more details
about the places . . . friends are checking into (map location, description,
directions, comments, and other check-ins), or . . . check . . . into a nearby
location." Patrick Miller, How To Use Facebook Places, PCWORLD (Aug. 20,
2010, 5:52 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/203819/howtousefacebook_
places.html.
3. Foursquare had over ten million users as of September 2011. About
Foursquare, supra note 1.
4. See Donald W. Garland & Carol M. Bast, Is the Government Riding
Shotgun? Recent Changes in Automobile Technology and the Right to Privacy,
46 CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (2010) (noting the utility of GPS devices in "providing
detailed step-by-step driving instructions or proximity to a type of business
the motorist wishes to locate without consulting a map, calling for emergency
services in the event of an accident, and locating a stolen vehicle."). For an
explanation of how GPS devices work, see generally Renee McDonald
Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? Gps Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55
UCLA L. REV. 409, 414-21 (2007).
5. Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a
Technological Age? 2 (Vand. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 10-64, 2011)
[hereinafter Slobogin, Technological Age], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734755 ("[T]his technological revolution is well on
its way to drastically altering the way police go about looking for evidence of
1
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Law enforcement officers have wholeheartedly embraced GPS
technology: "Arlington [Virginia] police said they have used GPS
devices 70 times in the last three years, mostly to catch car
thieves, but also in homicide, robbery and narcotics investigations.
Fairfax [Virginia] police used GPS devices 61 times in 2005, 52
times in 2006 and 46 times in 2007."6 These changes in tracking
technology and its widespread use by law enforcement has led to
concerns over potential privacy violations7 and infringement of the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.8
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to GPS tracking of automobiles,
however, several lower courts have considered the issue to mixed
results. This Article confronts the problems posed by the
technological outpacing of the law by proposing a solution
conforming to the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decisions,
beginning with Katz v. United States, that acknowledges the
potential invasion of privacy due to GPS tracking.9 I propose that
although attaching a GPS device to a vehicle in and of itself does
not offend the Fourth Amendment, only tracking on public roads
may be done without a warrant.10 For the results of any tracking
on private property to be admissible in court, a warrant must be
issued on probable cause.11 Part II analyzes recent developments
in case law in line with Katz and its progeny. Part III discusses
crime.").
6. Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon, WASH. POST, Aug. 13,
2008, at Al.
7. Hutchins, supra note 4, at 411 ("[Olne cannot escape the conclusion that
technological advancements now enable substantial encroachments into zones
formerly deemed wholly personal.").
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
the reasonable expectation of privacy is violated). In Katz, the Supreme Court
held a listening device placed on a public phone booth violated the Fourth
Amendment, as there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed
phone booth. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
10. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another."). This Article does not address the
constitutional issues implicated by police retrieval of GPS data stored by units
built into the cars themselves.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the tension between privacy and the increasing use of GPS
technology by law enforcement. Part IV proposes a solution that
enables law enforcement to continue surveillance in public areas to
the extent already permitted under Fourth Amendment doctrine,
and provides a bright-line rule regarding surveillance on private
property.
II. KEEPING UP WITH KATZ, KNoTs, KARO, AND KYLLo: FOURTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES OF GPS TRACKING
The inability of the law to keep pace with advances in
surveillance techniques has created enormous frustration in the
application of Fourth Amendment precedent.12 The seminal
surveillance case of Katz v. United States13 still provides the
foundation of any inquiry into unreasonable searches or seizures,
however, it "has not been a good shield for privacy against
intrusive new technologies." 4 Subsequent decisions in United
States v. Knotts,15 United States v. Karo,16 and Kyllo v. United
12. See, e.g., Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant at 1, Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281
(2010) (No. 0521-09-5) [hereinafter ACLU VA Briefj, available at
http://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Foltz-Amicus-VA-Ct-of-
Appeals.pdf (noting twenty-seven years have passed since the so-called
"beeper cases" were decided); Orin Kerr, Does the Fourth Amendment Prohibit
Warrantless GPS Surveillance?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 13, 2009, 9:46
PM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/13/does-the-fourth-amendment-prohibit-warr
antless-gps-surveillance/ ("Surveillance Tool 1.0 is quickly replaced by Tool 1.1
and then 1.2. The Supreme Court can't possibly decide a new case every time
the tool changes."); Vivek Kothari, Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons:
The Transformative Nature of GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment 3
(June 29, 2009) (unpublished article), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1427476 ("The Fourth
Amendment has always played the proverbial tortoise to technology's hare.").
13. Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH L. REV. 904,
904 (2004) ("Katz v. United States is the king of Supreme Court surveillance
cases.").
14. Id. at 906.
15. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (monitoring signals of beeper placed in container
driver transported to owner's property did not violate reasonable expectation
of privacy). The police placed a tracking device within a container, which was
then placed into Knotts's car. The Court held "[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case." Id. at 282.
16. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (monitoring of a beeper in a
private residence violates the Fourth Amendment). A beeper was placed into a
container in a car, however, unlike Knotts, this beeper entered a private
residence. Id. at 714-15. As "private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable," following the tracking device into the
private residence violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 714.
2011] 3
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States,'7 have only further blurred the lines as to when the
government may engage in warrantless electronic surveillance.
Several federal circuits have already confronted the difficulties
posed by the Katz line of cases and changing societal values in the
face of invasive technologies.
A. United States v. Garcia
In Garcia, the police received information that Bernardo
Garcia-who previously served time for methamphetamine
offenses-provided meth to an informant, purchased materials for
the manufacturing of methamphetamine, and "bragged that he
could manufacture meth in front of a police station without being
caught." 8 They located the vehicle he drove and placed a "pocket-
sized, battery-operated, commercially available" GPS device under
the car. 19 After the retrieval of the device, the police discovered
Garcia had been traveling to a large parcel of land.20 The police
received the landowner's consent to search the land and discovered
meth-making materials. Garcia arrived during the search, and
police discovered more incriminating evidence in his car after
arresting him. 21 The Seventh Circuit held a GPS tracking device
attached to a vehicle without a warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 22
In holding the placement of the tracking device did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, the court relied on Knotts's determination
that "the mere tracking of a vehicle on public streets by means of a
similar though less sophisticated device (a beeper) is not a
search."23 Writing for the court, Judge Posner noted police could
"follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras
mounted on lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth,"
without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment; the fact that a
17. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding the use of sense-
enhancing technology to gather any information regarding interior of home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into
constitutionally protected area constitutes a search and requires a warrant).
Police used thermal imagers to determine whether grow-lights were being
used to grow marijuana. Id. The Court held "that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area . . . at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use." Id. at 46.
18. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 883 (2007).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 995-96.
22. Id. 994.
23. Id. at 995 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 ("A person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.")).
4 [45:1
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tracking device placed on the vehicle allowed them to do the same
without going into the field "is a distinction without any practical
difference."24 The only real difference is the technology:
[Ihit is the difference between the old technology-the technology of
the internal combustion engine-and newer technologies (cameras
are not new, of course, but coordinating the images recorded by
thousands of such cameras is). But GPS tracking is on the same
side of the divide with the surveillance cameras and the satellite
imaging, and if what they do is not searching in Fourth Amendment
terms, neither is GPS tracking. 25
Judge Posner reserved the question of whether mass
surveillance, as opposed to the targeted surveillance of Garcia,
could eventually be deemed a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.26
B. United States v. Pineda-Moreno
In Pineda-Moreno, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents monitored Juan Pineda-Moreno's Jeep for a four-month
period using GPS devices; "[e]ach device was about the size of a
bar of soap and had a magnet affixed to its side, allowing it to be
attached to the underside of a car."27 The agents placed a device on
the Jeep seven times: four times when the vehicle was parked on
public streets, once while parked in a public parking lot, and twice
when the vehicle was parked in Pineda-Moreno's driveway. 28
Agents arrested Pineda-Moreno after tracking him from a
marijuana grow site.29 The Ninth Circuit followed the Seventh
Circuit's lead when it held the warrantless tracking of a car's
movements did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was
not a search, as Pineda-Moreno did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his car's movements.30
Pineda-Moreno argued the installation of the tracking
devices, especially those installed while the Jeep remained in his
driveway, violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Government conceded the DEA agents violated the curtilage 1 of
24. Id. at 996.
25. Id. at 997.
26. Id. at 998 ("Should government someday decide to institute programs of
mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such
surveillance as a search.").
27. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010),
reh'g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1212.
31. Curtilage is "[t]he land or yard adjoining a house, usually within an
enclosure. Under the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage is an area usually
protected from warrantless searches." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (3d
2011] 5
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Pineda-Moreno's home by entering onto the driveway; the panel
ignored the curtilage issue,32 however, and determined that even if
it was in the curtilage, driveways are "only semi-private area[s]
... [and] Pineda-Moreno did not take steps to exclude passersby[s]
from his driveway, [therefore] he cannot claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it, regardless of whether a portion of it
was located within the curtilage of his home."33
The panel also dismissed Pineda-Moreno's claims that the
other five installations of the GPS device violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. The court noted that law enforcement's use of
advanced technology did not transform legitimate surveillance
techniques under Knotts and Kyllo into violations of the Fourth
Amendment: "Insofar as [Pineda-Moreno's] complaint appears to
be simply that scientific devices such as the [tracking devices]
enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply
has no constitutional foundation. We have never equated police
efficiency with unconstitutionality and decline to do so now."34
Chief Judge Kozinski heavily criticized the panel in his
dissent from the petition for rehearing en banc for restricting
established Fourth Amendment curtilage doctrine. 5 He heatedly
argued that by imposing a requirement that people must take
affirmative steps in order for the curtilage to be considered
private, the court engaged in an act of "unselfconscious cultural
elitism,"36 favoring wealthier citizens who could afford to guard
their "privacy with the aid of electric gates, tall fences, security
booths, remote cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols."37 He
further noted "the vast majority of the 60 million people living in
the Ninth Circuit will see their privacy materially diminished by
pocket ed. 2006).
32. "We need not decide, however, whether Pineda-Moreno's vehicle was
parked within the curtilage of his home." Pinedo-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215.
33. Id. The court noted, "[i]f a neighborhood child had walked up Pineda-
Moreno's driveway and crawled under his Jeep to retrieve a lost ball or
runaway cat, Pineda-Moreno would have no grounds to complain." Id. But see
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting):
[T]here's no limit to what neighborhood kids will do, given half a
chance: They'll jump the fence, crawl under the porch, pick fruit from
the trees, set fire to the cat and micturate on the azaleas. To say that
the police may do on your property what urchins might do spells the
end of Fourth Amendment protections for most people's curtilage.
34. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284).
35. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). See also
Adam Cohen, The Government Can Use GPS To Track Your Moves, TIME (Aug.
25, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html
(noting that "courts have long held that people have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their homes and in the 'curtilage,' a . . . legal term for the area
around the home.").
36. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123.
37. Id.
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the panel's ruling."38 Chief Judge Kozinski also dismissed the
panel's reliance on Knotts, focusing instead on Kyllo's reluctance to
leave people "at the mercy of advancing technology."3 9 He asserted
the majority's rule failed to "take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development."40
The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed with the Ninth
Circuit in holding the warrantless tracking of a registered sex
offender, suspected of unsolved sex offenses, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 41 There, the police placed a GPS device on a
van owned by David Foltz's employer but driven exclusively by
Foltz.42 Police inserted the device "'sort of underneath the bumper
to a place that is not observable [from] the public street.' . . . The
GPS device was attached to the left side of the rear bumper using
a magnet and 'a sticky substance,"'43 and the police were able to
track the van in real time and store the van's movements. 44
Following the signal, police observed Foltz assault a woman and
arrested him.4 5 In dismissing Foltz's Fourth Amendment
arguments, the court noted, "police used the GPS device to crack
this case by tracking [Foltz] on the public roadways-which they
could, of course, do in person any day of the week at any hour
without obtaining a warrant,"4 6 and there was "no societal interest
in protecting the privacy of those activities that might occur in a
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1125 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
40. Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 ("[W]e must take the long view ... [t]he Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens." (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
41. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 292, reh'g en banc granted, 699 S.E.2d 522 (Va. Ct.
App. 2010). The court analyzed Foltz's claims under both the Fourth
Amendment and the Virginia Constitution, however as the "privacy rights in
the Virginia Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States
Constitution," the court spoke in terms of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 285
n.6.
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id. at 284.
44. Id.
45. Chief Judge Walter S. Felton, Jr., concurred in the result, however, he
would have affirmed on the basis of the eyewitness testimony rather than
deciding the Fourth Amendment issue. Id. at 293 (Felton, C.J., concurring).
He did note, however, that he "[had] no concerns with the analysis of the
majority in its determination that the placement of the GPS on the van and
the use of the GPS tracking information did not violate [Foltz's] Fourth
Amendment rights." Id. In its en banc decision, the court bypassed the Fourth
Amendment issue and upheld Foltz's conviction on the eyewitness testimony.
Foltz v. Commonwealth, 706 S.E.2d 914, 920 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc).
46. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 289.
72011]
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bumper."47
Not all of Foltz's recorded movements took place on public
roads; the tracking device continued to record his movements
while he was on the private property of his employer.48 The court
summarily dismissed the assertion that this violated Foltz's
rights, as the property belonged to his employer and "[tihe
'potential' use of GPS tracking in other circumstances to follow
individuals into truly private areas has no place in the analysis of
this case."4 9 Persuaded by Garcia and Pineda-Moreno, the court
declined to consider the possibility of widespread surveillance in
its determination.5 0
C. United States v. Maynard
Breaking with the Ninth and Seventh Circuit,51 the D.C.
Circuit held the warrantless use of a GPS device to track Antoine
Jones's movements continuously for a month violated the Fourth
Amendment, as tracking defeated Jones's reasonable expectation
of privacy. 52 Unlike the other circuits, the court held Knotts did
not control the present case.53 In reaching its determination, the
court distinguished between movements between places and
movement over time: "Knotts held only that '[a] person traveling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,' not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end . . . ."54
The court further argued this case presented the question reserved
by the court in Knotts: "Whether a warrant would be required in a
case involving 'twenty-four hour surveillance,' stating 'if such
47. Id. at 287.
48. Id. at 292.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 289. See also Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010);
Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (noting that should the government decide to
implement systems of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, the
definition of surveillance under the Fourth Amendment may have to be
reevaluated).
51. Professor Kerr disagrees there is any real circuit split and states, "[tihe
two cases are like apples and oranges, at least if you imagine a world where no
one has ever seen or heard of an orange." Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari
Filed in Pineda-Moreno, The Ninth Circuit GPS Case, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petition-
for-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-gps-case/. It is this Article's
position, however, that Maynard constitutes a significant divergence from
previous GPS cases.
52. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted sub nom., United States v. Jones, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4956 (June 27,
2011) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
53. Id. at 556.
54. Id. at 557 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
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dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions
should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable."'55
In holding that Knotts did not control, the court fell back on
Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy.56 Again, the court
distinguished between movements between two places (public) and
those over a period of time (private):
First, unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of
one's movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed
to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those
movements is effectively nil. Second, the whole of one's movements
is not exposed constructively even though each individual movement
is exposed, because that whole reveals more-sometimes a great deal
more-than does the sum of its parts.5 7
Professor Orin Kerr describes this "potentially revolutionary
Fourth Amendment decision" as the "mosaic theory" of the Fourth
Amendment: "Whether government conduct is a search is
measured not by whether a particular individual act is a search,
but rather whether an entire course of conduct, viewed collectively,
amounts to a search."5 8 This approach has been critiqued on both
its practicality5 9 and its conformance to doctrine.60 The Supreme
55. Id. at 556 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84).
56. Id. at 558 ("Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable depends in
large part upon whether that expectation relates to information that has been
'expose[d] to the public."' (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351)).
57. Id.
58. Orin Kerr, DC Circuit Introduces Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment,
Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Mosaic Theory],
http://volokh.com/20lO/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-
amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/.
59. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-
Site Information, 2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[Maynard] did not
attempt to define the length of time over which location tracking technology
must be sustained to trigger the warrant requirement. I recognize that any
such line-drawing is, at least to some extent, arbitrary, and that the need for
such arbitrariness arguably undermines the persuasiveness of the rationale of
Maynard."); Kerr, Mosaic Theory, supra note 58 ("One-month of surveillance is
too long, the court says. But how about 2 weeks? 1 week? 1 day? 1 hour? .. . At
the end of that one day, the first day of monitoring would be constitutional ...
But by continuing to monitor the GPS device for more time, that first day of
monitoring eventually and retroactively becomes unconstitutional. It becomes
part of the mosaic.").
60. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (holding the installation of GPS, which stored
defendant's movements for sixty hours, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment). "Maynard's reasoning does not fit comfortably with the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment search cases." Id.; United States v. Jones, 625
F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihis question
2011] 9
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Court granted certiorari on two questions: "Whether the
warrantless use of a tracking device on [Jones's] vehicle to monitor
its movements on public streets violated the Fourth
Amendment,"61 and "[w]hether the government violated [Jones's]
Fourth Amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device
on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent."62
These cases illustrate the difficulty confronting the courts due
to the rising use of GPS tracking. Changing technology, years
beyond the simple beeper of Knotts and Karo, provides the
Government an unparalleled ability to track suspects unchecked
by judicial supervision. Instead of having a clear consensus on the
Fourth Amendment standard required for police, courts cannot
even agree whether Supreme Court precedent applies. This next
part will compare courts' analyses of precedent, the severe privacy
implications of the courts' failure to regulate GPS use, and will
argue for a middle ground requiring a warrant in order to track
suspects onto private property.
III. TOWARDS A NEW MIDDLE GROUND: HONORING PRECEDENT
AND PRIZING PRIVACY
A. Of Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo: Does Supreme Court Precedent
Actually Cover GPS Tracking?
The proper application of precedent forms the central conflict
between the cases that uphold GPS tracking and those that strike
it down.63 The Ninth and Seventh Circuits proclaimed themselves
should be reviewed by the court en banc because the panel's decision is
inconsistent not only with every other federal circuit which has considered the
case, but more importantly, with controlling Supreme Court precedent.");
Motion to Extend the Stay of the Mandate in This Case at 6, Jones v. United
States, No. 08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/doj-motion.gps.pdf ("[W]e submit that this
Court's theory that (otherwise permissible) incidents of GPS monitoring can
violate the Fourth Amendment when aggregated, conflicts with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Karo."); Orin Kerr, Applying the Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment to Disclosure of Stored Records, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Apr. 5, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/04/05/applying-the-mosaic-
theory-of-the-fourth-amendment-to-disclosure-of-stored-records/ ("[Als I see it,
the oddity of the inquiries called for by the Maynard mosaic theory shows why
it is not part of the Constitution at all. In Fourth Amendment law, the
lawfulness of governent [sic] conduct has always been viewed discretely: Each
government act is either a search or it is not a search.").
61. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d
766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, Apr. 15, 2011, available at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/doj-gps cert. Oral argument occurred on
November 8, 2011.
62. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, cert. granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4956 (June 27,
2011).
63. Compare Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17, and Garcia, 474 F.3d at
996-98, with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-58.
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bound by Knotts to uphold the use of GPS. They dismissed the
Karo and Kyllo concerns of encroaching technology by limiting
those cases to technology that intruded on the privacy of the home,
familiar Fourth Amendment ground for judges.64 This lock-step
reliance on decades-old cases falsely insists there can be no privacy
outside the home and ignores significant changes in what society
recognizes as intrusive.
The sophistication of the technology utilized had little impact
on the decisions upholding GPS tracking. Judge Posner rejected
the assertion that vast improvement in technology impacted the
case at hand, stating the "difference between the old technology-
the technology of the internal combustion engine-and newer
technologies [the surveillance camera] .... GPS tracking is on the
same side of the divide with the surveillance cameras and the
satellite imaging, and if what they do is not searching in Fourth
Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking."6 5 The Ninth Circuit
panel agreed, stating Pineda-Moreno's "complaint appears to be
simply that scientific devices such as the [tracking devices]
enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply
has no constitutional foundation. We have never equated police
efficiency with unconstitutionality and decline to do so now."6 6
These assertions vastly understate the difference in technology, as
"the electronic tracking devices used by the police . . . have little in
common with the primitive devices in Knotts."67
Many critics of the courts' supposed powerlessness in the face
of Knotts's assertion that "[a] person travelling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another,"68 focus on the
64. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 ("Pineda-Moreno makes no claim
that the agents used the tracking devices to intrude into a constitutionally
protected area."); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 ("Kyllo does not help our defendant,
because his case . . . is not one in which technology provides a substitute for a
form of search unequivocally governed by the Fourth Amendment."). See also
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-
there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.");
Karo, 468 U.S. at 718 ("We discern no reason for deviating from the general
rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.").
65. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997.
66. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284). See
also Jones, 625 F.3d at 768 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) ("There is no material
difference between tracking the movements of the Knotts defendant with a
beeper and tracking the Jones appellant with a GPS.").
67. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). See also
Kothari, supra note 12, at 26 ("If beeper technology is like Marco Polo, GPS is
more like the precision guided missiles popularized by the media in the First
Gulf War.").
68. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
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dramatic difference between the technology used by law
enforcement in Knotts and the GPS cases. "GPS technology
enables what beepers could not-the flawless, uninterrupted, and
twenty-four hour tracking of a suspect."69 GPS devices' accuracy
makes them effective tools for law enforcement, 70 but they truly
differ from the Knotts and Karo beepers in their ability to
completely replace physical surveillance. Unlike the beepers in
Knotts and Karo, GPS devices have the potential to take the place
of traditional police surveillance techniques. Their very natures
are different: "[B]eeper technology forces the police to physically
follow the individuals they suspect of wrongdoing. . . . GPS
technology, on the other hand, enables law enforcement to forego
actual surveillance and track the movements of a suspect."71
Whereas the police in the beeper cases had to accompany the
tracking device in order to observe movements, the police in the
GPS cases could use "advanced satellite and computer technology
to remotely monitor . . . movements across public and private
areas. This was not human observation assisted by technology, but
non-human technological tracking unassisted by humans in any
manner after the initial installation of the GPS device."72 Police
could attach hundreds of devices at low-cost, without needing to
articulate any reason for doing so, 73 and let a computer track the
movements while the police work on other cases. 74 Although this
69. Kothari, supra note 12, at 25; see also ACLU VA Brief, supra note 12, at
2 ("GPS tracking (1) does not merely augment the senses of police officers, but
provides a complete technological replacement for human surveillance; (2)
enables twenty-four hour a day 'dragnet' surveillance at nominal cost.").
70. Hutchins, supra note 4, at 417 ("GPS receivers use trilateration in three
dimensions . . . to calculate their latitude, longitude, and altitude. . . . [T]he
information transmitted from the GPS satellites allow a basic receiver to
accurately determine its position to within one or two meters.").
71. Kothari, supra note 12, at 25-26.
72. Brief of Elec. Frontier Found. & Am. Civil Liberties Union of the Nat'l
Capital Area as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11, United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 08-3030, 08-3034). See also
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) ("But the beeper
could perform no tracking on its own, nor could it record its location. If no one
was close enough to pick up the signal, it was lost forever.").
73. See, e.g., Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 287 (Wood, J., dissenting):
If the Fourth Amendment is out of the picture, then it makes no
difference whether a police officer subjectively had a good reason to
activate a device that he attached, if he acted on a whim, or if he was
systematically using devices put on every car in a bad part of town to
see where the drivers might be going. . . . Police officers could cruise the
parking lots of shopping malls or the streets in one of Chicago's rougher
neighborhoods, install GPSs randomly, and begin tracking any person
they chose.
74. Slobogin, Technological Age, supra note 5, at 4. ("Today it is both
technologically and economically feasible to outfit every car with a Radio
Frequency Identification Device that communicates current and past routes to
an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) computer.").
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may seem tempting in the never-ending war on crime, permitting
the government to use this low-cost, highly-effective tool wholly
outside of judicial supervision creates the potential for disastrous
constitutional consequences.
B. Privacy in a GPS World
The increasing presence of technology in society raises
legitimate privacy concerns that may not be adequately addressed
under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine.75 Perhaps the most
worrisome aspect of the rise of GPS tracking is the "creep" factor:
"There is something creepy and un-American about such
clandestine and underhanded behavior. To those of us who have
lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feeling of d6ja
vu."7 6 The idea that the government may surreptitiously monitor
people's movements over an extended period of time, which in
other cases might be considered stalking,77 contradicts the notion
that even in public there is a degree of privacy.78 The judges
writing against warrantless GPS tracking have raised concerns
over the vast amount of information to which police would be
privy: "What the technology yields and records with breathtaking
quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of
where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations-political,
religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few-and of the
pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits."7 9 Not only
can rampant police surveillance expose past activity, but it may
75. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 303, 306 (2010) ("In a robust socially networked world, Fourth
Amendment privacy by itself may offer little constitutional guidance or
protection.").
76. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
77. "The act or an instance of following another by stealth." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 671 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
78. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (referencing the
"'right to be let alone' [which] one of our wisest Justices characterized as 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 ("A person does not leave his privacy
behind when he walks out his front door, however."); Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d
at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting):
You can preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by
traveling at night, through heavy traffic, in crowds, by using a
circuitous route, disguising your appearance, passing in and out of
buildings and being careful not to be followed. But there's no hiding
from the all-seeing network of GPS satellites that hover overhead,
which never sleep, never blink, never get confused and never lose
attention.
79. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 2009) (striking
down warrantless GPS tracking on state constitution grounds). See also
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 ("[The] whole reveals more-sometimes a great deal
more-than does the sum of its parts.").
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even chill future activity.
Pervasive fear over being watched may lead to changes in
social behavior.8 0 Even if mandatory GPS installation in cars
never occurs,8 1 society as a whole will suffer if the judiciary turns
its back on GPS tracking:
The ill effects of virtual searches do not stop with official misuse of
information resulting from general searches. Less tangible, but
arguably just as important, is the discomfort people feel when they
are being watched or monitored even if, or perhaps especially when,
they aren't sure they are being targeted. In other words, for many
individuals privacy vis-A-vis the government has value in and of
itself, regardless of whether there is evidence of government abuse,
over-stepping or mistake. 82
Constant paranoia as to when the government may or may
not be following its citizens prevents people from fully
participating in society. Fear that someone may record, and keep
that record, of trips to the clinic, place of worship, and political
activities keeps people from living their lives.83 As the "primary
arbiter of how government investigates its citizens,"84 the Fourth
Amendment should act to prevent this inference in private lives of
the citizens. The problem thus presented is reconciling what the
majority of courts have interpreted to be clear Supreme Court
doctrine with the very real specter of omnipresent privacy
invasion.
C. Balancing the Scales: GPS and Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory
The Fourth Amendment serves as more than just a
procedural guideline for police investigations, it serves as "a
constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its
agents."85 The low-cost of GPS surveillance incentivizes its use
80. Crocker, supra note 75, at 344 ("Searches can impose 'chilling effects' on
individuals' ability and willingness to engage in public social and political
activities when they fear unpleasant interactions with police. . . . From a
political liberty perspective, we have more to fear from government search and
surveillance than from the exercise of eminent domain.").
81. Judge Posner suggested it was not outside the realm of possibility for a
future law to require "all new cars to come equipped with the device so that
the government can keep track of all vehicular movement in the United
States." Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
82. Slobogin, Technological Age, supra note 5, at 11-12.
83. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200.
84. Slobogin, Technological Age, supra note 5, at 22.
85. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151-52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). See also Crocker, supra note 75, at 308 ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment . . . protects a political right of the people to organize community
life free from pervasive government surveillance and interference." (quoting
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over other forms of surveillance.8 6 The cost of surveillance
functions as a check on the government as it forces police to
evaluate where to spend their resources and determine if the
likelihood of finding evidence outweighs the cost of surveillance. If
the cost of surveillance is practically nil, the chance that police are
going to consider whether following a target is worth it will be as
well.8 7 Professor Orin Kerr's Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory
provides a "correction mechanism" for this conundrum.8 8
Equilibrium-Adjustment postulates that the Supreme Court
adopts lower Fourth Amendment protections "[w]hen changing
technology or social practice makes evidence substantially harder
for the government to obtain."8 9 Conversely, when technology
makes evidence collection "substantially easier for the government
to obtain, the Supreme Court often embraces higher protections to
help restore the prior level of privacy protection."90 Professor Kerr
hypothesizes the Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory was a
motivating factor for the development of the car search doctrine,
which in turn served as a justification for GPS searches.
The development of the automobile presented a significant
challenge to law enforcement. Chief Justice William Howard Taft
referred to the automobile as "the greatest instrument to promote
immunity from punishment for crime that we have introduced in
many, many years."91 "Cars were akin to homes and sealed
packages on wheels. And yet the judges of the 1920s realized that
Herring, 555 U.S. at 151-52)).
86. Continuous human surveillance for a week would require all the
time and expense of several police officers, while comparable
photographic surveillance would require a net of video cameras so
dense and so widespread as to catch a person's every movement, plus
the manpower to piece the photographs together. . . . On the contrary,
the marginal cost of an additional day-or week, or month-of GPS
monitoring is effectively zero.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565.
87. Hutchins, supra note 4, at 463 ("The use of GPS-enhanced tracking is
most productive for law enforcement, and most troublesome in constitutional
terms, when it is used over extended spans of time. But, it is in precisely these
cases that officers, armed with the luxury of time, have little reason not to
secure the preauthorization of a warrant. Indeed, in many cases, this is
precisely what law enforcement is already doing.").
88. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium-
Adjustment] ("Equilibrium-adjustment is a judicial response to changing
technology and social practice. When new tools and new practices threaten to
expand or contract police power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of
Fourth Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.").
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the
American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 125 n.408 (2006).
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extending the home protections to cars threatened to cut short
police power so dramatically as to make many laws virtually
unenforceable." 92 The Court under Chief Justice Taft, according to
Professor Kerr, crafted the car search doctrine in Carroll v. United
States,93 in order to restore police power to the "level that enabled
the 'proper administration of our criminal laws."' 94 Because the
current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment insufficiently
addressed this "'instrument of evil' . . . greatly expand[ing]
opportunities for criminal activity,"95 the Court reinterpreted the
amendment to tip the scales in favor of security and law
enforcement over privacy. 96 Under Professor Kerr's theory, the
Supreme Court should strengthen the Fourth Amendment's
protection against warrantless GPS tracking.
As previously discussed, GPS tracking greatly enhances police
power by providing law enforcement the ability to monitor people's
movements over long stretches of time without using as many
physical and economic resources. 97 This tips the police-
power/privacy-right balance sharply in favor of the government,
and the scale is in need of a correction mechanism. "The use of the
tracking device gives the police an important advantage: It lets the
police track location more easily [than] before and more often in
circumstances that would be difficult otherwise."98 Indeed, judges
striking down GPS tracking have engaged in equilibrium-
adjustment.99 In the case of GPS tracking, however, the
92. Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 88, at 27.
93. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147 ("The intent of Congress to make a distinction
between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private
dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road vehicles . . . is thus clearly
established... . Is such a distinction consistent with the Fourth Amendment?
We think that it is.").
94. Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 88, at 27 (quoting People v.
Case, 190 N.W. 289, 292 (Mich. 1922)). See also Substituted Brief for the
United States on Reargument at 20-21 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (No. 15), available at 1924 WL 25788 at *20-21:
Prior to the invention of the automobile, the well-settled rules of the
common law and the decisions of this and the several State courts had
established, with comparative certainty, a proper balance between the
necessities of public authority, on the one hand, and the demands of
personal liberty, on the other. The invention of this remarkable
instrument of transport, however, has operated to disturb that balance.
95. Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 88, at 28 (quoting Post,
supra note 91, at 125 n.408).
96. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 ("There is a tradeoff between security and
privacy, and often it favors security.").
97. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
98. Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 88, at 9.
99. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 ("[Plrolonged GPS monitoring reveals an
intimate picture of the subject's life that he expects no one to have-short
perhaps of his spouse. The intrusion such monitoring makes into the subject's
private affairs stands in stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue
[45:116
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Equilibrium-Adjustment conflicts with traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine to such an extent that the Court may strike
down warrantless GPS tracking wholesale. In that case, a
legislative solution may permit society to express its disapproval
with the practice of warrantless GPS surveillance without court
involvement.
IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY
A. Filling the Gaps: Congressional Solution in lieu of Court
Involvement
As an alternative to courts engaging in equilibrium-
adjustment, Congress has previously intervened in filling
perceived gaps in Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Electronic
Privacy Communications Act (ECPA)100 passed in order to fill the
Fourth Amendment gap left by Katz and third-party doctrine in
the interception of wireless conversations.o10 Courts have taken
note of the gaps in Fourth Amendment doctrine as the impetus for
congressional action in the face of emerging technology: "The
growth of electronic communications has stimulated Congress to
enact statutes that provide both access to information heretofore
unavailable for law enforcement purposes and, at the same time,
protect users of such communication services from intrusion that
Congress deems unwarranted."102 Some argue a legislative
solution would be better than a judicial one:
Judges struggle to understand even the basic facts of such
technologies, and often must rely on the crutch of questionable
metaphors to aid their comprehension. Judges generally will not
know whether those metaphors are accurate, or whether the facts
before them are typical or atypical given the technology of the past
in Knotts."); Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) ("By
holding that this kind of surveillance doesn't impair an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy, the panel hands the government the power to track the
movements of every one of us, every day of our lives.").
100. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986).
101. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 5 (2007) [hereinafter
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK]. See also DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 7
(2009), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf
("Title III [of the ECPA] ... provides a comprehensive statutory framework
that regulates real-time monitoring of wire and electronic communications. Its
scope encompasses, and in many significant ways exceeds, the protection
offered by the Fourth Amendment.").
102. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic
Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, 620 F.3d 304, 306
(3d Cir. 2010).
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or the present. These dynamics make it easy for judges to
misunderstand the context of their decisions and their likely effect
when technology is in flux. Judges who attempt to use the Fourth
Amendment to craft broad regulatory rules covering new
technologies run an unusually high risk of crafting rules based on
incorrect assumptions of context and technological practice. 103
Congressional action has the potential to address the
situation more thoroughly. Whereas a court will have to confine
itself to the case presented, Congress can craft legislation to
anticipate future events. However, even Congress has
acknowledged its difficulty in keeping pace with technological
advances in other areas of the law, 104 and previous legislative
solutions have not provided the clear guidance promised.105
Moreover, "while legislative remedies should offer supplemental
coverage, they are not a necessary stand-in for constitutional
safeguards."10 6 The courts, not the legislature, must take the
initiative in protecting against abuses of GPS surveillance in order
to provide the maximum constitutional protection. 107
B. "This Far You May Come and No Farther".10 8 Protecting
Privacy Without Burdening Security
For privacy advocates, "the threshold for assessing 'how much
technological enhancement of ordinary perception turns mere
observation into a Fourth Amendment search' has been
crossed." 09 Many have called for GPS to require warrants in all
103. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875-76
(2004); see also Joseph Goldstein, The Oldest Bench Ever, SLATE (Jan. 18,
2011), http://www.slate.com/id/2281318 (describing the difficulties older judges
have with new technology).
104. See Stephanie Gaylord Forbes, Note, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying
Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1717, 1743 n.164 (2011) (discussing Congress's difficulty in keeping up with
the technology used in child pornography cases).
105. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 166 (2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE]
("[F]ederal electronic surveillance statutes are famously complex, if not
entirely impenetrable.") (internal quotation omitted).
106. Hutchins, supra note 4, at 412-13.
107. Senator Roy Wyden (D-OR) introduced the Geolocational Privacy and
Surveillance Act ["GPS Act"] on June 15, 2011. Geolocational Privacy and
Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011). The GPS Act would prohibit the
warrantless interception and disclosure of location information and its use in
criminal trials. Id. §§ 2602(a)-(h), 2603. The text of the bill does not, however,
limit the ability of police to install tracking devices. Therefore, the Court
should take the opportunity to decide the constitutional issue.
108. Job 38:11.
109. Hutchins, supra note 4, at 457; see generally ACLU VA Brief, supra note
12, at 15 ("Taken together, U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that
intrusive police techniques revealing the details of a person's private activities
18s [45:1
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circumstances,110 however, this deprives law enforcement of a
valuable tool in the fight on crime. In order to protect privacy
interests and without unduly restricting law enforcement's ability
to investigate and prevent crime, police must be able to articulate,
at minimum, a reasonable suspicion for the placement of GPS
devices on vehicles, and also obtain a warrant for tracking on
private property. Requiring a warrant only to prove a vehicle
entered private property would reduce concerns of unchecked
police power while permitting police to track vehicles on public
roads.
Reconciling the Knotts line of cases with reasonable
restrictions on police power requires concessions from each side of
the debate."' A reasonable suspicion standard for the placement
of a GPS device, regardless of whether on public or private
property, requires police "to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion."112 Furthermore, they will have
to determine if evidence of a vehicle's presence on private property
constitutes a vital aspect of the case, such that it necessitates the
procurement of a warrant. If so, police must present evidence of
probable cause, justifying the surveillance of a tracking device to a
neutral magistrate, just as they would to secure any other
warrant. Arguably, this would require police to obtain warrants in
all GPS cases "because they have no way of knowing in advance
whether the beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside
private premises." 113 This argument failed to persuade the Court
in Karo,114 and the state of advanced technology hardly makes the
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search even if those activities may be
exposed to the public, especially when the techniques involve use of
sophisticated technology that does not merely enhance an officer's own
senses.").
110. See generally ACLU VA Brief, supra note 12, at 1 (making the argument
that "[w]ithout a warrant requirement, an individual's every movement could
be subject to remote monitoring, and permanent recording, at the sole
discretion of any police officer."); Hutchins, supra note 4, at 462 ("[T]he Court
has consistently declared its preference for warrants to be the presumptive
baseline."); Haley Plourde-Cole, Note, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in the Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (2010).
111. As with most compromises, "it is unlikely that all involved will be
completely happy with any result. . . . [T]his is the nature of compromise."
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
112. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
113. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
114. If agents are required to obtain warrants prior to monitoring a
beeper when it has been withdrawn from public view, the Government
argues, for all practical purposes they will be forced to obtain warrants
in every case in which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no
way of knowing in advance whether the beeper will be transmitting its
signals from inside private premises. The argument that a warrant
requirement would oblige the Government to obtain warrants in a large
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argument more convincing now. In fact, it is possible for police in
certain jurisdictions to obtain warrants without having to appear
in court,115 so the warrant requirement places little burden on law
enforcement.
The solution admittedly does not completely dispel fears over
the accumulation of data on people's movement as expressed by
the courts in Weaver and Maynard."6 It would, however, prevent
from admission into evidence a vehicle's presence on private
property, including privately owned parking lots open to the
public," 7 and would require justification of the placement in the
first place. Faced with the bright-line rule that only truly public
roads will be admissible in court without a warrant, police will be
forced to evaluate their cases more carefully to determine where
the resources are best spent."i8 Police could no longer merely
assert the "naked eye" defense to justify the electronic tracking,119
providing relief against "the erosion of personal privacy wrought
by technological advances."120
V. CONCLUSION
GPS technology benefits society in numerous ways. In
addition to the conventional and popular uses,121 the technology
has been used to deliver blood to military outposts,122 supervise
number of cases is hardly a compelling argument against the
requirement.
Id.
115. See Martha Neil, Police in Fla. Town Use Email and Skype to Obtain
Warrants While Still on the Scene, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/police-infla. town-use-e-
mailand-skype to obtain warrants/ (noting the use of the internet to obtain
a warrant, rather than conventional methods).
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. Under this rule, an officer could offer into evidence that GPS tracked
the vehicle to a public road in front of private property, but, absent a warrant
authorizing tracking, would not be able to testify the vehicle entered the
private property.
118. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
119. "[Alnyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made,
and the fact of his final destination." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82, 285.
Moreover, it raises the question, "[i]f the naked eye viewing without physical
intrusion could have occurred, why didn't it?" SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK,
supra note 101, at 64.
120. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
121. Supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
122. GPS Equipped Parachutes Deliver Blood From the Sky To Save Lives,
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prisoners on release,123 and decrease truancy in schools.124 In a nod
to the rapid development of technology, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment cannot ignore
technological advancements. 12 5 In order to keep the Fourth
Amendment relevant,126 the Court must acknowledge the
intrusiveness of technology as well as its benefits.
The creep factor articulated by Chief Judge Kozinski
illustrates the need for a swift resolution by the courts in favor of
providing clear standards for law enforcement.127 The idea that
police may use sophisticated technology to craft an elaborate
portrait of people's movements and associations over an extended,
and seemingly limitless, period of time, without any judicial
oversight violates the promise of the Fourth Amendment to guard
against unreasonable intrusions into private life. 128 The
temptation to utilize technological surveillance, which is more
cost-efficient than traditional surveillance and yields more
accurate results,129 increases in the current economic climate when
police departments around the country face budget crises.130
123. Patti Davis, Freedom is Too Good for Hinckley, TIME (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2061239,00.html (stating
John Hinckley must carry a GPS phone during his time away from the
hospital).
124. Eric Carpenter, Kids who Skip School are Tracked by GPS, THE
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com
/news/school-288730-students-program.html.
125. "[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or in development." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36. Cf. City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) ("The judiciary risks error by
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear.").
126. "The Fourth Amendment's increasing irrelevance stems from the fact
that the Supreme Court is mired in precedent decided in another era."
Slobogin, Technological Age, supra note 5, at 2.
127. See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)
(explaining that "there is something creepy and un-American about unchecked
police use of GPS tracking devices"); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
128. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("Searches conducted without warrants have
been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of
a judicial officer .. . be interposed between the citizen and the police.")
(internal citation and quotation omitted); SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE, supra
note 105, at 35 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment doesn't protect privacy by stopping
the government from searching; it works by requiring judicial oversight and
mandating that the government justify its measures.).
129. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Ron Nixon, In Budget's Fine Print, Real and
Illusory Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A16 ("State and local police will be
losing more than $900 million this year-a 25 percent reduction-in Justice
Department money used to hire hundreds of local police officers, pay for new
technology and provide other services. The cuts come at a time when many
departments are already facing state budget crunches."); Joseph Goldstein,
Police Force Nearly Halved, Camden Feels Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011,
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Without a firm boundary line between acceptable and
unconstitutional surveillance techniques, police departments will
engage in this court-sanctioned stalking. By requiring a warrant
to prove a vehicle's presence on private property, but permitting
warrantless GPS tracking on public roads, 131 the Court would
recognize the inherent intrusiveness of GPS tracking without
completely sacrificing effective police surveillance tools. The
implementation of such a standard, however, should not wait until
GPS technology becomes the forewarned totalitarian surveillance
program.
Judge Posner urges patience in extending Fourth Amendment
protections against warrantless GPS tracking, saying "it will be
time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be
interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search."1 32 The
constitutional violation, however, remains the same whether one
person or one million people face standardless GPS tracking. As a
society, we should endeavor to prevent constitutional violations
instead of waiting for the worst-case-scenario to arrive, especially
in cases in which the violation is readily foreseen. We cannot
forever postpone a decision, claiming "there will be time enough
... to determine whether different constitutional principles may
be applicable,"133 when, as in the case of GPS surveillance, the
time has already arrived.
at A14 ('If it doesn't need a gun and a badge at that location,' officers are not
sent, [said] the city's police chief, J. Scott Thomson . . . ."); Jesse McKinley &
Malia Wollan, Facing Deficit, Oakland Put Police Force on Chopping Block,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A9.
131. Provided reasonable suspicion exists to place the GPS device on the
vehicle in the first place. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
132. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. Accord Jones, 625 F.3d at 769 (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting) (explaining that he "cannot discern any distinction between the
supposed invasion by aggregation of data between the GPS-augmented
surveillance and a purely visual surveillance of substantial length."); Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (declining to find that GPS tracking constituted a
Fourth Amendment violation, the court found that "[tihe only information the
agents obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations where ...
[the] car traveled, information the agents could have obtained by following the
car."); Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 289 ("[We ... find that Judge Posner's comments
about judicial restraint are also appropriate and applicable here . . . .
Consequently, we do not address the concerns raised by appellant regarding
what may one day be potential future practices of the police.").
133. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
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